Abstract: Advertising and Analytics (A&A) companies have started collaborating more closely with one another due to the shift in the online advertising industry towards Real Time Bidding (RTB). One natural way to understand how user tracking data moves through this interconnected advertising ecosystem is by modeling it as a graph. In this paper, we introduce a novel graph representation, called an Inclusion graph, to model the impact of RTB on the diffusion of user tracking data in the advertising ecosystem. Through simulations on the Inclusion graph, we provide upper and lower estimates on the tracking information observed by A&A companies. We find that 52 A&A companies observe at least 91% of an average user's browsing history under reasonable assumptions about information sharing within RTB auctions. We also evaluate the effectiveness of blocking strategies (e.g., AdBlock Plus), and find that major A&A companies still observe 40-90% of user impressions, depending on the blocking strategy.
Introduction
In the last decade, the online display advertising industry has massively grown in size and scope. According to the Interactive Advertising Bureau (IAB), revenue from the online display ad industry in the U.S. totaled $88B in 2017, a growth of 21.4% from 2016 [63] . This increased spending is fueled by advances that enable advertisers to target users with increasing levels of precision, even across different devices and platforms.
Another recent change in the online display advertising ecosystem is the shift from ad networks to ad exchanges, where advertisers bid on impressions being Muhammad Ahmad Bashir: Northeastern University, Email: ahmad@ccs.neu.edu Christo Wilson: Northeastern University, E-mail: cbw@ccs.neu.edu sold in Real Time Bidding (RTB) auctions. The rise of RTB has forced Advertising and Analytics (A&A) companies to collaborate more closely with one another, in order to exchange data about users and facilitate bidding on impressions [10, 58] . The move towards RTB has also caused A&A companies to specialize into particular roles. For example, Supply-Side Platforms (SSPs) work with publishers (e.g., CNN) to help manage their relationship with ad exchanges, while Demand-Side Platforms (DSPs) try to optimize ad placement and bidding on behalf of advertisers. In short, due to RTB, the online advertising ecosystem has become enormously complex.
A natural way to model this complex ecosystem is in the form of a graph. Graph models that accurately capture the relationships between publishers and A&A companies are extremely important for practical applications, such as estimating revenue of A&A companies [26] , predicting whether a given domain is a tracker [34] , or evaluating the effectiveness of domainblocking strategies on preserving users' privacy.
However, to date, technical limitations have prevented researchers from developing accurate graph models of the online advertising ecosystem. For example, Gomer et al. [29] propose a Referer graph, where nodes represent publishers or A&A domains, and two nodes a i and a j are connected if an HTTP message to a j is observed with a i as the HTTP Referer. Unfortunately, as we will show, graphs built using Referer information may contain erroneous edges in cases where a thirdparty script is embedded directly into a first-party context (i.e., is not sandboxed in an iframe).
In this paper, to model the diffusion of user tracking data within RTB auctions, we propose a novel and accurate representation of the advertising graph called an Inclusion graph. The Inclusion graph corrects the technical problem of the Referer graph by using the actual inclusion relationships between domains to represent edges, rather than imprecise Referer relationships. We are able to construct Inclusion graphs, thanks to advances in browser instrumentation that allow researchers to conduct web crawls that record the exact provenance of all HTTP(S) requests [6, 10, 41] .
We use crawled data consisting of around 2M impressions from popular e-commerce websites collected by a specially instrumented version of Chrome [10] to construct the Inclusion graph. In § 4, we examine the fundamental graph properties of the Inclusion graph and compare it to a Referer graph, created using the same dataset to understand their salient differences. In § 5, we demonstrate a concrete use case for the Inclusion graph by using simulations to model the flow of tracking data to A&A companies. Furthermore, we compare the efficacy of different real-world and graph theoretic "blocking" strategies (e.g., AdBlock Plus [2] , Ghostery [25] , and Disconnect [18] ) at reducing the flow of tracking information to A&A companies.
Overall, we make the following key contributions: -We introduce the Inclusion graph as a model for capturing the complexity of the online advertising ecosystem. We use the Inclusion graph as a substrate for modeling the flow of impressions to A&A companies by taking into account the browsing behavior of users and the dynamics of RTB auctions.
-We find that the Inclusion graph has substantive differences in graph structure compared to the Referer graph because 48.4% of resource inclusions in our crawled data have an inaccurate Referer.
-Through simulations, we find that 52 A&A companies are each able to observe 91% of an average user's impressions as they browse, under modest assumptions about data sharing in RTB auctions. 636 A&A companies are able to observe at least 50% of an average user's impressions. Even under the strictest simulation assumptions, the top 10 A&A companies observe 89-99% of all user impressions.
-We simulate the effect of five blocking strategies, and find that AdBlock Plus (the world's most popular ad blocking browser extension [45, 62] , is ineffective at protecting users' privacy because major ad exchanges are whitelisted under the Acceptable Ads program [73] . In contrast, Disconnect blocks the most information flows to A&A companies, followed by removal of top 10% A&A nodes. However, even with strong blocking, major A&A companies still observe 40-80% of user impressions.
The raw data we use in this study is publicly available. 1 We have also publicly released the source code and data from this study. 2 1 http://personalization.ccs.neu.edu/Projects/Retargeting/ 2 http://personalization.ccs.neu.edu/Projects/AdGraphs/
Background and Related Work
In this section, we review technical details of and current computer science research on the online display advertising ecosystem. We start by discussing related work on user privacy and tracking. Next, we present examples of the current display ad serving process and define the roles of different actors in the ecosystem, followed by a brief overview of efforts to empirically measure these processes. Lastly, we examine prior work that modeled the ad ecosystem as a graph.
Tracking and Blocking
To show relevant ads to users, advertisers rely heavily on collecting information about users as they browse the web. This data collection is achieved by embedding trackers into webpages that gather browsing information about each user.
The area of tracking has been well studied. Krishnamurthy et al. and others have documented the pervasiveness of trackers and the associated user privacy implications over time [15, 20, 26, 33, [37] [38] [39] . Furthermore, tracking techniques have evolved over time. Persistent cookies [35] , local state in browser plugins [7, 68, 69] , and various browser fingerprinting methods [1, 21, 36, 51, 55, 57, 65] are some of the techniques that have been deployed to track users. Englehardt et al. [20] found evidence of tracking via the Audio and Battery Status JavaScript APIs. In addition to tracking users themselves, advertisers try to maximize their knowledge of each user's interest profile by sharing information with each other via cookie matching [1, 10, 23, 58] . Falahrastegar et al. examine how tracking differs across geographic regions [22] .
Users have become increasingly concerned with the amount and types of tracking information collected about them [47, 70] . Several surveys have investigated users' concerns about targeted ads, their preferences towards tracking, and usage of privacy tools [8, 42, 48, 66, 71] . Concerns about the privacy implications of tracking (as well as the insecurity of online ad networks [75] ) has led to increased adoption of tools that block trackers and ads. Two studies have examined the usage of ad blockers in-the-wild [45, 62] , while Walls et al. looked at efforts to whitelist "acceptable advertisers" [73] .
Merzdovnik et al. critically examined the effectiveness of tracker blocking tools [49] ; in contrast, Nithyanand et al. studied advertisers' efforts to counter The user visits publisher p 2 , which then includes resources from SSP s 1 and exchange e 2 -. e 2 solicits bids and sells the impression to e 1 , which then holds another auction , ultimately selling the impression to a 1 .
ad blockers [56] . Mughees et al. examined the prevalence of anti-ad blockers in the wild [53] . In this work, we expand on the existing blocking literature by taking the effects of ad auctions and cookie matching into account. The research community has proposed a variety of mechanisms to stop online tracking that go beyond blacklists of domains and URLs. Li et al. [43] and Ikram et al. [32] used machine learning to identify trackers, while Papaodyssefs et al. [60] examined the use of private cookies to avoid being tracked. Nikiforakis et al. propose the complementary idea of adding entropy to the browser to evade fingerprinting [54] . However, despite these efforts, third-party trackers are still pervasive and pose real privacy issues to users [49] .
The Online Advertising Ecosystem
Numerous studies have chronicled the online advertising ecosystem, which is composed of companies that: track users, serve ads, act as platforms between publishers (websites that rely on advertising revenue to pay for content creation) and advertisers, or all of the above. Mayer et al. present an accessible introduction to this topic in [46] . In this work, we collectively refer to companies engaged in analytics and advertising as A&A companies.
Recently, the online ad ecosystem has begun to shift from ad networks to ad exchanges, which implement Real Time Bidding (RTB) auctions to sell impressions to advertisers. In the advertising industry, the term "impression" is used when advertising or tracking content is rendered in a user's browser after they visit a webpage [17] . To participate in RTB auctions, A&A companies must implement cookie matching, which is a process by which different A&A companies exchange their unique tracking identifiers for specific users. Several studies have examined the emergence of cookie matching [1, 10, 23, 58] . Ghosh et al. theoretically model the incentives for A&A companies to collaborate with their competitors in RTB auction systems [24] . Figure 1(a) illustrates the typical process used by A&A companies to match cookies. When a user visits a website , JavaScript code from a third-party advertiser a 1 is automatically downloaded and executed in the user's browser . This code may set a cookie in the user's browser, but this cookie will be unique to a 1 , i.e., it will not contain the same unique identifiers as the cookies set by any other A&A companies. Furthermore, the Same Origin Policy (SOP) prevents a 1 's code from reading the cookies set by any other domain. To facilitate bidding in future RTB auctions, a 1 must match its cookie to the cookie set by an ad exchange like e 1 . As shown in the figure, a 1 's JavaScript accomplishes this by programmatically causing the browser to send a request to e 1 . The JavaScript includes a 1 's cookie in the request, and the browser automatically adds a copy of e 1 's cookie, thus allowing e 1 to create a match between its cookie and a 1 's.
Figure 1(b) shows an example of how an ad may be shown on publisher p 2 using RTB auctions. When a user visits p 2 , JavaScript code is automatically downloaded and executed either from a Supply Side Platform (SSP) or an ad exchange. SSPs are A&A companies that specialize in maximizing publisher revenue by forwarding impressions to the most lucrative ad exchange. Eventually the impression arrives at the auction held by ad exchange e 2 , and e 2 solicits bids from advertisers and Demand Side Platforms (DSPs) . DSPs are A&A companies that specialize in executing ad campaigns on behalf of advertisers. Note that all participants in the auction observe the impression; however, because only e 2 's cookie is available at this point, auction participants that have not matched cookies with e 2 will not be able to identify the user.
The process of filling an impression may continue even after an RTB auction is won, because the winner may be yet another ad exchange or ad network. As shown in Figure 1(b) , the impression is purchased from e 2 by e 1 , who then holds another auction and ultimately sells to a 1 (the advertiser from the cookie matching example) . Ad exchanges and ad networks routinely match cookies with each other to facilitate the flow of impression inventory between markets.
Measurement Studies.
Barford et al. broadly characterized the web adscape and identified systematically important ad networks [9] . Rodriguez et al. measured the ad ecosystem that serves mobile devices [72] , while Zarras et al. specifically examined ad networks that serve malicious ads [75] . Gill et al. modeled the revenue earned by different A&A companies [26] , while other studies have used empirical measurements to determine the value of individual users to online advertisers [58, 59] . Many studies have used a variety of methods to study the targeted ads that are displayed to users under a variety of circumstances [9-11, 16, 30, 44] .
Ad Ecosystem Graphs
A natural structure for modeling the online ad ecosystem is a graph, where nodes represent publishers and A&A companies, and edges capture relationships between these entities. Gomer et al. [29] While Gomer et al. provided interesting insights into the structure of the ad ecosystem, their referralbased graph representation has a significant limitation. As we describe in § 3.3, relying on the HTTP Referer does not always capture the correct relationships between A&A parties, thus leading to incorrect graphs of the ad ecosystem. We re-create this graph representation using our dataset (see § 3) and compare its properties to a more accurate representation in § 4.
Kalavri et al. [34] created a bipartite graph of publishers and associated A&A domains, then transformed it to create an undirected graph consisting solely of A&A domains. In their representation, two A&A domains are connected if they were included by the same publisher. This construction leads to a highly dense graph with many complete cliques. Kalavri et al. leveraged the tight community structure of A&A domains to predict whether new, unknown URLs were A&A or not. However, this co-occurrence representation has a conceptual shortcoming: it may include edges between A&A domains that do not directly communicate or have any business relationship. Due to this shortcoming, we do not explore this graph representation in this work.
Methodology
Our goal is to capture the most accurate representation of the online advertising ecosystem, which will allow us to model the effect of RTB on diffusion of user tracking data. In this section, we introduce the dataset used in this study and describe how we use it to build a graph representation of the ad ecosystem.
Dataset
In this work, we use the dataset provided by Bashir et al. [10] . The goal of [10] was to causally infer the information sharing relationships between A&A companies by (1) crawling products from popular e-commerce websites and then (2) observing corresponding retargeted ads on publishers. Bashir et al. conducted web crawls that covered 738 major e-commerce websites (e.g., Amazon) and 150 popular publishers (e.g., CNN). 3 The authors chose top e-commerce sites from Alexa's hierarchical list of online shops [4] , and manually chose publishers from the Alexa Top-1K. They crawled 10 manually selected products per e-commerce site to signal strong intent to trackers and advertisers, followed by 15 randomly chosen pages per publisher to elicit display ads. In total, Bashir et al. repeated the entire crawl nine times, resulting in data for around 2M impressions.
Inclusion Trees
Bashir et al. [10] used a specially instrumented version of Chromium for their web crawls. Their crawler recorded the inclusion tree for each webpage, which is a data structure that captures the semantic relationships between elements in a webpage (as opposed to the DOM, which captures syntactic relationships) [6, 41] . The crawler also recorded all HTTP request and response headers associated with each visited URL.
To illustrate the importance of inclusion trees, consider the example webpage shown in Figure 2 (a). The DOM shows that the page from publisher p ultimately includes resources from four third-party domains (a 1 through a 4 ). It is clear from the DOM that the request to a 3 is responsible for causing the request to a 4 , since the script inclusion is within the iframe. However, it An example HTML document and the corresponding inclusion tree, Inclusion graph, and Referer graph. In the DOM representation, the a 1 script and a 2 img appear at the same level of the tree; in the inclusion tree, the a 2 img is a child of the a 1 script because the latter element created the former. The Inclusion graph has a 1:1 correspondence with the inclusion tree. The Referer graph fails to capture the relationship between the a 1 script and a 2 img because they are both embedded in the first-party context, while it correctly attributes the a 4 script to the a 3 iframe because of the context switch.
is not clear which domain generated the requests to a 2 and a 3 : the img and iframe could have been embedded in the original HTML from p, or these elements could have been created dynamically by the script from a 1 . In this case, the inclusion tree shown in Figure 2 (b) reveals that the image from a 2 was dynamically created by the script from a 1 , while the iframe from a 3 was embedded directly in the HTML from p.
The instrumented Chromium binary used by Bashir et al. was able to correctly determine the provenance of webpage elements, regardless of how they were created (e.g., directly in HTML, via inline or remotely included script tags, dynamically via eval(), etc.), or where they were located (in the main context or within iframes). This was accomplished by tagging all scripts with provenance information (i.e., first-party for inline scripts), and then dynamically monitoring the execution of each script. New scripts created during the execution of a given script (e.g., via document.write()) were linked to their parent. 4 More details about how Chromium was instrumented and inclusion trees were extracted are available in [6] .
Cookie Matching.
The Bashir et al. dataset also includes labels on edges of the inclusion trees indicating cases where cookie matching is occurring. These labels are derived from heuristics (e.g., string matching to identify the passing of cookie values in HTTP parameters) and causal inferences based on the presence of retargeted ads. We use this data in § 5 to constrain some of our simulations.
Graph Construction
A natural way to model the online ad ecosystem is using a graph. In this model, nodes represent A&A companies, publishers, or other online services. Edges capture relationships between these actors, such as resource inclusion or information flow (e.g., cookie matching).
Canonicalizing Domains.
We use the data described in § 3.1 to construct a graph for the online advertising ecosystem. We use effective 2 ndlevel domain names to represent nodes. For example, x.doubleclick.net and y.doubleclick.net are represented by a single node labeled doubleclick. Throughout this paper, when we say "domain", we are referring to an effective 2 nd -level domain name. 5 Simplifying domains to the effective 2 nd -level is a natural encoding for advertising data. Consider two inclusion trees generated by visiting two publishers: publisher p 1 forwards the impression to x.doubleclick.net and then to advertiser a 1 . Publisher p 2 forwards to y.doubleclick.net and advertiser a 2 . This does not imply that x.doubleclick and y.doubleclick only sell impressions to a 1 and a 2 , respectively. In reality, DoubleClick is a single auction, regardless of the subdomain, and a 1 and a 2 have the opportunity to bid on all impressions. Individual inclusion trees are snapshots of how one particular impression was served; only in aggregate can all participants in the auctions be enumerated. Further, 3 rd -level domains may read 2 nd -level cookies without violating the Same Origin Policy [52] : x.doubleclick.com and y.doubleclick.com may both access cookies set by .doubleclick, and do in practice.
The sole exception to our domain canonicalization process is Amazon's Cloudfront Content Delivery Network (CDN). We routinely observed Cloudfront hosting ad-related scripts and images in our data. We manually examined the 50 fully-qualified Cloudfront domains 5 None of the publishers and A&A domains in our dataset have two-part TLDs, like .co.uk, which simplifies our analysis.
(e.g., d31550gg7drwar.cloudfront.net) that were preor proceeded by A&A domains in our data, and mapped each one to the corresponding A&A company (e.g., adroll in this case).
Inclusion graph.
We propose a novel representation called an Inclusion graph that is the union of all inclusion trees in our dataset. Our representation is a directed graph of publishers and A&A domains. An edge 
Referer graph.
Gomer et al. [29] also proposed a directed graph representation consisting of publishers and A&A domains for the online advertising ecosystem. In this representation, each publisher and A&A domain is a node, and edge
shows an example Referer graph corresponding to the given webpage. The Bashir et al. [10] dataset includes all HTTP request and response headers from the crawl, and we use these to construct the Referer graph.
Although the Referer and Inclusion graphs seem similar, they are fundamentally different for technical reasons. Consider the examples shown in Figure 2 : the script from a 1 is included directly into p's context, thus p is the Referer in the request to a 2 . This results in a Referer graph with two edges that does not correctly encode the relationships between the three parties: p → a 1 and p → a 2 . In other words, HTTP Referer headers are an indirect method for measuring the semantic relationships between page elements, and the headers may be incorrect depending on the syntactic structure of a page. Our Inclusion graph representation fixes the ambiguity in the Referer graph by explicitly relying on the inclusion relationships between elements in webpages. We analyze the salient differences between the Referer and Inclusion graph in § 4.
Weights.
Additionally, we also create a weighted version of these graphs. In the Inclusion graph, the weight of 
Detection of A&A Domains
For us to understand the role of A&A companies in the advertising graph, we must be able to distinguish A&A domains from publishers and non-A&A third parties like CDNs. In the inclusion trees from the Bashir et al. dataset [10] , each resource is labeled as A&A or non-A&A using the EasyList and EasyPrivacy rule lists. For all the A&A labeled resources, we extract the associated 2 nd -level domain. To eliminate false positives, we only consider a 2 nd -level domain to be A&A if it was labeled as A&A more than 10% of the time in the dataset.
Coverage
There are two potential concerns with the raw data we use in this study: does the data include a representative set of A&A domains? and does the data contain all of the outgoing edges associated with each A&A domain? To answer the former question, we plot Figure 3 , which shows the overlap between the top x A&A domains in our dataset (ranked by inclusion frequency by publishers) with all of the A&A domains included by the Alexa Top-5K websites. 6 We observe that 99% of the 150 most frequent A&A domains appear in both samples, while 89% of the 500 most frequent appear in both. These findings confirm that our dataset includes the vast majority of prominent A&A domains that users are likely to encounter on the web. To answer the second question, we plot Figure 4 , which shows the number of unique external A&A domains contacted by A&A domains in our dataset as the crawl progressed (i.e., starting from the first page crawled, and ending with the last). Recall that the dataset was collected over nine consecutive crawls spanning two weeks of time, each of which visited 9,630 individual pages spread over 888 domains.
We observe that the number of A&A →A&A edges rises quickly initially, going from 0 to 800 in 3,600 crawled pages. Then, the growth slows down, requiring an additional 12,000 page visits to increase from 800 to 900. In other words, almost all A&A edges were discovered by half-way through the very first crawl; eight subsequent iterations of the crawl only uncovered 12.5% more edges. This demonstrates that the crawler reached the point of diminishing returns, indicating that the vast majority of connections between A&A domains that existed at the time are contained in the dataset.
Graph Analysis
In this section, we look at the essential graph properties of the Inclusion graph. This sets the stage for a higherlevel evaluation of the Inclusion graph in § 5.
Basic Analysis
We begin by discussing the basic properties of the Inclusion graph, as shown in Table 1 . For reference, we also compare the properties with those of Referer graph.
Edge Misattribution in the Referer graph. The Inclusion and Referer graph have essentially the same number of nodes, however the Referer graph has 159% more edges. We observe that 48.4% of resource inclusions in the raw dataset have an inaccurate Referer (i.e., the first-party is the Referer even though the resource was requested by third-party JavaScript), which is the cause of the additional edges in the Referer graph.
There is a massive shift in the location of edges between the Inclusion and Referer graph: the number of publisher → A&A edges decreases from 33,716 in the Referer graph to 10,274 in the Inclusion graph, while the number of A&A → A&A edges increases from 7,408 to 13,546. In the Referer graph only 3% of A&A → A&A edges are reciprocal, versus 31% in the Inclusion graph. Taken together, these findings highlight the practical consequences of misattributing edges based on Referer information, i.e., relationships between A&A companies that should be in the core of the network are incorrectly attached to publishers along the periphery.
Structure and Connectivity.
As shown in Table 1, the Inclusion graph has large, well-connected components. The largest Weakly Connected Component (WCC) covers all but eight nodes in the Inclusion graph, meaning that very few nodes are completely disconnected. This highlights the interconnectedness of the ad ecosystem. The average node degree in the Inclusion graph is 13.6, and <7% of nodes have in-or out-degree ≥50. This result is expected: publishers typically only form direct relationships with a small-number of SSPs and exchanges, while DSPs and advertisers only need to connect to the major exchanges. The small number of high-degree nodes are ad exchanges, ad networks, trackers (e.g., Google Analytics), and CDNs.
The Inclusion graph exhibits a low average shortest path length of 2.7, and a very high average clustering coefficient of 0.48, implying that it is a "small world" graph. We show the "small-worldness" metric S ∆ in Table 1 , which is computed for a given undirected graph G and an equivalent random graph G R
, where C ∆ is the average clustering 8 coefficient, and L ∆ is the average shortest path length [31] . The Inclusion graph has a large S ∆ ≈ 31, confirming that it is a "small world" graph.
Lastly, Table 1 shows that the Inclusion graph is disassortative, i.e., low degree nodes tend to connect to high degree nodes.
Summary.
Our measurements demonstrate that the structure of the ad network graph is troubling from a privacy perspective. Short path lengths and high clustering between A&A domains suggest that data tracked from users will spread rapidly to all participants in the ecosystem (we examine this in more detail in § 5). This rapid spread is facilitated by high-degree hubs in the 7 Equivalence in this case means that for G and G R , |V | = |V R | and |E|/|V | = |E R |/|V R |. 8 We compute average clustering by transforming directed graphs into undirected graphs, and we compute average shortest path lengths on the SCC. network that have disassortative connectivity, which we examine in the next section.
Cores and Communities
We now examine how nodes in the Inclusion graph connect to each other using two metrics: k-cores and community detection. The k-core of a graph is the subset of a graph (nodes and edges) that remain after recursively removing all nodes with degree ≤ k. By increasing k, the loosely connected periphery of a graph can be stripped away, leaving just the dense core. In our scenario, this corresponds to the high-degree ad exchanges, ad networks, and trackers that facilitate the connections between publishers and advertisers. Figure 5 plots k versus the size of the WCC for the Inclusion graph. The plot shows that the core of the Inclusion graph rapidly declines in size as k increases, which highlights the interdependence between A&A domains and the lack of a distinct core.
Next, to examine the community structure of the Inclusion graph, we utilized three different community detection algorithms: label propagation by Raghavan et al. [64] , Louvain modularity maximization [12] , and the centrality-based Girvan-Newman [27] algorithm. We chose these algorithms because they attempt to find communities using fundamentally different approaches.
Unfortunately, after running these algorithms on the largest WCC, the results of our community analysis were negative. Label propagation clustered all nodes into a single community. Louvain found 14 communities with an overall modularity score of 0.44 (on a scale of -1 to 1 where 1 is entirely disjoint clusters). The largest community contains 771 nodes (40% of all nodes) and 3252 edges (12% of all edges). Out of 771 nodes, 37% are A&A. However, none of the 14 communities corresponded to meaningful groups of nodes, either segmented by type (e.g., publishers, SSPs, DSPs, etc.) or segmented by ad exchange (e.g., customers and partners centered around DoubleClick). This is a known deficiency in modularity maximization based methods, that they tend to produce communities with no realworld correspondence [5] . Girvan-Newman found 10 communities, with the largest community containing 1,097 nodes (57% of all nodes) and 16,424 edges (63% of all edges). Out of 1,097 nodes, 64% are A&A. However, the modularity score was zero, which means that the Girvan-Newman communities contain a random assortment of internal and external (cross-cluster) edges.
Overall, these results demonstrate that the web display ad ecosystem is not balkanized into distinct groups of companies and publishers that partner with each other. Instead, the ecosystem is highly interdependent, with no clear delineations between groups or types of A&A companies. This result is not surprising considering how dense the Inclusion graph is.
Node Importance
In this section, we focus on the importance of specific nodes in the Inclusion graph using two metrics: betweenness centrality and weighted PageRank. As before, we focus on the largest WCC. The betweenness centrality for a node n is defined as the fraction of all shortest paths on the graph that traverse n. In our scenario, nodes with high betweenness centrality represent the key pathways for tracking information and impressions to flow from publishers to the rest of the ad ecosystem. For weighted PageRank, we weight each edge in the Inclusion graph based on the number of times we observe it in our raw data. In essence, weighted PageRank identifies the nodes that receive the largest amounts of tracking data and impressions throughout each graph. Table 2 shows the top 10 nodes in the Inclusion graph based on betweenness centrality and weighted PageRank. Prominent online advertising companies are well represented, including AppNexus (adnxs), Facebook, and Integral Ad Science (adsafeprotected). Similar to prior work, we find that Google's advertising domains (including DoubleClick and 2mdn) are the most prominent overall [29] . Unsurprisingly, these companies all provide platforms, i.e., SSPs, ad exchanges, and ad networks. We also observe trackers like Google Analytics and Tag Manager. Interestingly, among 14 unique domains across the two lists, ten only appear in a single list. This suggests that the most important domains in terms of connectivity are not necessarily the ones that receive the highest volume of HTTP requests.
Information Diffusion
In § 4, we examined the descriptive characteristics of the Inclusion graph, and discuss the implications of this graph structure on our understanding of the online advertising ecosystem. In this section, we take the next step and present a concrete use case for the Inclusion graph: modeling the diffusion of user tracking data across the ad ecosystem under different types of ad and tracker blocking (e.g., AdBlock Plus and Ghostery). We model the flow of information across the Inclusion graph, taking into account different blocking strategies, as well as the design of RTB systems and empirically observed transition probabilities from our crawled dataset.
Simulation Goals
Simulation is an important tool for helping to understand the dynamics of the (otherwise opaque) online advertising industry. For example, Gill et al. used datadriven simulations to model the distribution of revenue amongst online display advertisers [26] .
Here, we use simulations to examine the flow of browsing history data to trackers and advertisers. Specifically, we ask: 1. How many user impressions (i.e., page visits) to publishers can each A&A domain observe?
2. What fraction of the unique publishers that a user visits can each A&A domain observe?
3. How do different blocking strategies impact the number of impressions and fraction of publishers observed by each A&A domain?
These questions have direct implications for understanding users' online privacy. The first two questions are about quantifying a user's online footprint, i.e., how much of their browsing history can be recorded by different companies. In contrast, the third question investigates how well different blocking strategies perform at protecting users' privacy.
Simulation Setup
To answer these questions, we simulate the browsing behavior of typical users using the methodology from Burklen et al. [14] . 9 In particular, we simulate a user browsing publishers over discreet time steps. At each time step our simulated user decides whether to remain on the current publisher according to a Pareto distribution (exponent = 2), in which case they generate a new impression on that publisher. Otherwise, the user browses to a new publisher, which is chosen based on a Zipf distribution over the Alexa ranks of the publishers. Burklen et al. developed this browsing model based on large-scale observational traces, and derive the distributions and their parameters empirically. This browsing model has been successfully used to drive simulated experiments in other work [40] . We generated browsing traces for 200 users. On average, each user generated 5,343 impressions on 190 unique publishers. The publishers are selected from the 888 unique first-party websites in our dataset (see § 3.1).
During each simulated time step the user generates an impression on a publisher, which is then forwarded to all A&A domains that are directly connected to the publisher. This emulates a webpage with multiple slots for display ads, each of which is serviced by a different SSP or ad exchange. However, it is insufficient to simply forward the impression to the A&A domains directly connected to each publisher; we also must account for ad exchanges and RTB auctions [10, 58] , which may cause the impression to spread farther on the graph. We discuss this process next. The simulated time step ends when all impressions arrive at A&A domains that do not forward them. Once all outstanding impressions have terminated, time increments and our simulated user generates a new impression, either from their currently selected publisher or from a new publisher. Fig. 7 . CDF of the weights on incoming edges for A&A nodes.
Impression Propagation
Our simulations must account for direct and indirect propagation of impressions. Direct flows occur when one A&A domain sells or redirects an impression to another A&A domain. We refer to these flows as "direct" because they are observable by the web browser, and are thus recorded in our dataset. Indirect flows occur when an ad exchange solicits bids on an impression. The advertisers in the auction learn about the impression, but this is not directly observable to the browser; only the winner is ultimately known.
Direct Propagation.
To account for direct propagation, we assign a termination probability to each A&A node in the Inclusion graph that determines how often it serves an ad itself, versus selling the impression to a partner (and redirecting the user's browser accordingly). We derive the termination probability for each A&A node empirically from our dataset. When an impression is sold, we determine which neighboring node purchases the impression based on the weights of the outgoing edges. For a node a i , we define its set of outgoing neighbors as N o (a i ). The probability of selling to neighbor
where w(a i → a j ) is the weight of the given edge. Figure 6 shows the termination probability for A&A nodes in the Inclusion graph. We see that 25% of the A&A nodes have a termination probability of one, meaning that they never sell impressions. The remaining 75% of A&A nodes exhibit a wide range of termination probabilities, corresponding to different business models and roles in the ad ecosystem. For example, DoubleClick, the most prominent ad exchange, has a termination probability of 0.35, whereas Criteo, a well-known advertiser specializing in retargeting, has a termination probability of 0.63. Figure 7 shows the mean incoming edge weights for A&A nodes in the Inclusion graph. We observe that the distribution is highly skewed towards nodes with extremely high average incoming weights (note that the x-axis is in log scale). This demonstrates that heavyhitters like DoubleClick, GoogleSyndication, OpenX, and Facebook are likely to purchase impressions that go up for auction in our simulations.
Indirect Propagation.
Unfortunately, precisely accounting for indirect propagation is not currently possible, since it is not known exactly which A&A domains are ad exchanges, or which pairs of A&A domains share information. To compensate, we evaluate three different indirect impression propagation models: -Cookie Matching-Only: As we note in § 3.2, the Bashir et al. [10] dataset includes 200 empirically validated pairs of A&A domains that match cookies.
In this model, we treat these 200 edges as groundtruth and only indirectly disseminate impressions along these edges. Specifically, if a i observes an impression, it will indirectly share with a j iff a i → a j exists and is in the set of 200 known cookie matching edges. This is the most conservative model we evaluate, and it provides a lower-bound on impressions observed by A&A domains.
-RTB Relaxed: In this model, we assume that each A&A domain that observes an impression, indirectly shares it with all A&A domains that it is connected to. Although this is the correct behavior for ad exchanges like Rubicon and DoubleClick, it is not correct for every A&A domain. This is the most liberal model we evaluate, and it provides an upper-bound on impressions observed by A&A domains.
-RTB Constrained: In this model, we select a subset of A&A domains E to act as ad exchanges. Whenever an A&A domain in E observes an impression, it shares it with all directly connected A&A domains, i.e., to solicit bids. This model represents a more realistic view of information diffusion than the Cookie Matching-Only and RTB Relaxed models because the graph contains few but extremely well connected exchanges.
For RTB Constrained, we select all A&A nodes with out-degree ≥ 50 and in/out degree ratio r in the range 0.7 ≤ r ≤ 1.7 to be in E. These thresholds were chosen after manually looking at the degrees and ratios for known ad exchanges and ad exchanges marked by Bashir et al. [10] . This results in |E| = 36 A&A nodes being chosen as ad exchanges (out of 1,032 total A&A domains in the Inclusion graph). We enforce restrictions on r because A&A nodes with disproportionately large amounts of incoming edges are likely to be trackers (in- formation enters but is not forwarded out), while those with disproportionately large amounts of outgoing edges are likely SSPs (they have too few incoming edges to be an ad exchange). Table 6 in the appendix shows the domains in E, including major, known ad exchanges like App Nexus, Advertising.com, Casale Media, DoubleClick, Google Syndication, OpenX, Rubicon, Turn, and Yahoo. 150 of the 200 known cookie matching edges in our dataset are covered by this list of 36 nodes. Figure 8 shows hypothetical examples of how impressions disseminate under our indirect models. Figure 8(a) presents the scenario: a graph with two publishers connected to two ad exchanges and five advertisers. a 2 is a bidder in both exchanges, and serves as a DSP for a 4 and a 5 (i.e., it services their ad campaigns by bidding on their behalf). Light grey edges capture cases where the two endpoints have been observed cookie matching in the ground-truth data. Edge e 2 → a 3 is a false negative because matching has not been observed along this edge in the data, but a 3 must match with e 2 to meaningfully participate in the auction. Figure 8(b)-(d) show the flow of impressions under our three models. In all three examples, a user visits publishers p 1 and p 2 , generating two impressions. Further, in all three examples a 2 wins both auctions on behalf of a 5 ; thus e 1 , e 2 , a 2 , and a 5 are guaranteed to observe impressions. As shown in the figure, a 2 and a 5 observe both impressions, but other nodes may observe zero or more impressions depending on their position and the dissemination model. In Figure 8(b) , a 3 does not observe any impressions because its incoming edge has not been labeled as cookie matched; this is a false negative because a 3 participates in e 2 's auction. Conversely, in Figure 8 (d), all nodes always share all impressions, thus a 4 observes both impressions. However, these are false positives, since DSPs like a 2 do not routinely share information amongst all their clients.
Node Blocking
To answer our third question, we must simulate the effect of "blocking" A&A domains on the Inclusion graph. A simulated user that blocks A&A domain a j will not make direct connections to it (the solid outlines in Figure 8) . However, blocking a j does not prevent a j from tracking users indirectly: if the simulated user contacts ad exchange a i , the impression may be forwarded to a j during the bidding process (the dashed outlines in Figure 8 ). For example, an extension that blocks a 2 in Figure 8 will prevent the user from seeing an ad, as well as prevent information flow to a 4 and a 5 . However, blocking a 2 does not stop information from flowing to e 1 , e 2 , a 1 , a 3 , and even a 2 ! We evaluate five different blocking strategies to compare their relative impact on user privacy under our three impression propagation models: 1. We randomly blocked 30% (310) of the A&A nodes from the Inclusion graph. 10 2. We blocked the top 10% (103) of A&A nodes from the Inclusion graph, sorted by weighted PageRank. 3. We blocked all 594 A&A nodes from the Ghostery [25] blacklist.
4. We blocked all 412 A&A nodes from the Disconnect [18] blacklist.
5. We emulated the behavior of AdBlock Plus [2] , which is a combination of whitelisting A&A nodes from the Acceptable Ads program [73] , and blacklisting A&A nodes from EasyList [19] . After whitelisting, 634 A&A nodes are blocked.
We chose these methods to explore a range of graph theoretic and practical blocking strategies. Prior work has shown that the global connectivity of small-world graphs is resilient against random node removal [13], but we would like to empirically determine if this is true for ad network graphs as well. In contrast, prior work also shows that removing even a small fraction of top nodes from small-world graphs causes the graph to fracture into many subgraphs [50, 74] . Ghostery and Disconnect are two of the most widely-installed tracker blocking browser extensions, so evaluating their blacklists allows us to quantify how good they are at protecting users' privacy. Finally, AdBlock Plus is the most popular ad blocking extension [45, 62] , but contrary to its name, by default it whitelists A&A companies that pay to be part of its Acceptable Ads program [3] . Thus, we seek to understand how effective AdBlock Plus is at protecting user privacy under its default behavior.
Validation
To confirm that our simulations are representative of our ground-truth data, we perform some sanity checks. We simulate a single user in each model (who generates 5K impressions) and compare the resulting simulated inclusion trees to the original, real inclusion trees.
First, we look at the number of nodes that are activated by direct propagation in trees rooted at each publisher. Figure 9a shows that our models are conservative in that they generate smaller trees: the median original tree contains 48 nodes, versus 32, seven, and six from our models. One caveat to this is that publishers in our simulated trees have a wider range of fan-outs than in the original trees. The median publishers in the original and simulated trees have 11 and 12 neighbors, respectively, but the 75 th percentile trees have 16 and 30 neighbors, respectively.
Second, we investigate the depth of the inclusion trees. As shown in Figure 9b , the median tree depth in the original trees is three, versus two in all our models. The 75 th percentile tree depth in the original data is four, versus three in the RTB Relaxed and RTB Constrained models, and two in the most restrictive Cookie Matching-Only model. These results show that overall, our models are conservative in that they tend to generate slightly shorter inclusion trees than reality.
Third, we look at the set of A&A domains that are included in trees rooted at each publisher. For a publisher p that contacts a set A o p of A&A domains in our original data, we calculate
is the set of A&A domains contacted by p in simulation. Figure 10 plots the CDF of f p values for all publishers in our dataset, under our three models. We observe that for almost 80% publishers, 90% A&A domains contacted in the original trees are also contacted in trees generated by the RTB Relaxed model. This falls to 60% and 16% as the models become more restrictive. Fourth, we examine the number of ad exchanges that appear in the original and simulated trees. Examining the ad exchanges is critical, since they are responsible for all indirect dissemination of impressions. As shown in Figure 11 , inclusion trees from our simulations contain an order of magnitude fewer ad exchanges than the original inclusion trees, regardless of model. 11 This suggests that indirect dissemination of impressions in our models will be conservative relative to reality.
Number of Selected Exchanges.
Finally, we investigate the impact of exchanges in the RTB Constrained model. We select the top x A&A domains by out-degree to act as exchanges (subject to their in/out degree ratio r being in the range 0.7 ≤ r ≤ 1.7), then execute a simulation. As shown in Figure 12 , with 20
11 Because each of our models assumes that a different set of A&A nodes are ad exchanges, we must perform three corresponding counts of ad exchanges in our original trees. Fig. 10 . CDF of the fractions of A&A domains contacted by publishers in our original data that were also contacted in our three simulated models. or more exchanges the distribution of impressions observed by A&A domains stops growing, i.e., our RTB Constrained model is relatively insensitive to the number of exchanges. This is not surprising, given how dense the Inclusion graph is (see § 4). We observed similar results when we picked top nodes based on PageRank.
Results
We take our 200 simulated users and "play back" their browsing traces over the unmodified Inclusion graph, as well as graphs where nodes have been blocked using the strategies outlined above. We record the total number of impressions observed by each A&A domain, as well as the fraction of unique publishers observed by each A&A domain under different impression propagation models.
Triggered Edges. to have significant impact relative to the No Blocking baseline, in terms of removing edges or weight, under the Cookie Matching-Only and RTB Constrained models. Further, the top 10% blocking strategy removes less edges than Disconnect or Ghostery, but it reduces the remaining edge weight to roughly the same level as Disconnect, whereas Ghostery leaves more high-weight edges intact. These observations help to explain the outcomes of our simulations, which we discuss next.
No Blocking. First, we discuss the case where no A&A nodes are blocked in the graph. Figure 13 shows the fraction of total impressions (out of ∼5,300) and fraction of unique publishers (out of ∼190) observed by A&A domains under different propagation models. We find that the distribution of observed impressions under RTB Constrained is very similar to that of RTB Relaxed, whereas observed impressions drop dramatically under Cookie Matching-Only model. Specifically, the top 10% of A&A nodes in the Inclusion graph (sorted by impression count) observe more than 97% of the impressions in RTB Relaxed, 90% in RTB Constrained, and 29% in Cookie Matching-Only. We observe similar patterns for fractions of publishers observed across the three indirect propogating models. Recall that the Cookie Matching-Only and RTB Relaxed models function as lower-and upper-bounds on observability; that the results from the RTB Constrained model are so similar to the RTB Relaxed model is striking, given that only 36 nodes in the former spread impressions indirectly, versus 1,032 in the latter.
Although the overall fraction of observed impressions drops significantly in the Cookie Matching-Only model, Table 4 shows that the top 10 A&A domains observe 99%, 96%, and 89% of impressions on average under RTB Relaxed, RTB Constrained, and Cookie Matching-Only respectively. Some of the top ranked nodes are expected, like DoubleClick, but other cases are more interesting. For example, Pinterest is connected to 178 publishers and 99 other A&A domains. In the Cookie Matching-Only model, it ranks 47 because it is directly embedded in relatively few publishers, but it ascends up to rank seven and one, respectively, once indirect sharing is accounted for. This drives home the point that although Google is the most pervasively embedded advertiser around the web [15, 65] , there are a roughly 52 other A&A companies that also observe greater than 91% of users' browsing behaviors (in the RTB Constrained model), due to their participation in major ad exchanges.
With Blocking.
Next, we discuss the results when AdBlock Plus (i.e., the Acceptable Ads whitelist and EasyList blacklist) is used to block nodes. AdBlock Plus has essentially zero impact on the fraction of impressions observed by A&A domains: the results in Figure 14a under the RTB Constrained and RTB Relaxed models are almost coincident with those for the models when no blocking is applied at all. The problem is that the major ad networks and exchanges are all present in the Acceptable Ads whitelist, and thus all of their partners are also able to observe the impressions, even if they are (sometimes) prevented from actually showing ads to the user. Indeed, the top 10 nodes in Table 4 with no blocking and in Table 5 with AdBlock Plus are almost identical, save for some reordering.
Next, we examine Ghostery and Disconnect in Figure 14a . As expected, the amount of information seen by A&A domains decreases when we block domains from these blacklists. Disconnect's blacklist does a much better job of protecting users' privacy in our simulations: after blocking nodes using the Disconnect blacklist, 90% of the nodes see less than 40% of the impressions in the RTB Constrained model, and less than 53% in the RTB Relaxed model. In contrast, when using the Ghostery blacklist, 90% of the nodes see less than 75% of the impressions in both RTB models. Table 5 shows that top 10 A&A domains are only able to observe at most 40-59% and 73-83% of impressions when the Disconnect and Ghostery blacklists are used, respectively, depending on the indirect propagation model.
As shown in Figure 14b , blocking the top 10% of A&A nodes from the Inclusion graph (sorted by weighted PageRank) causes almost as much reduction in observed impressions as Disconnect. Table 5 helps to orient the top 10% blocking strategy versus Disconnect and Ghostery in terms of overall reduction in impression observability and the impact on specific A&A domains. In contrast, blocking 30% of the A&A nodes at random has more impact than AdBlock Plus, but less than Disconnect and Ghostery. Top 10 nodes under the "no blocking" and "random 30%" (not shown) strategies observe similar impression fractions. Both of these results agree with the theoretical expectations for small-world graphs, i.e., their connectivity is resilient against random blocking, but not necessarily targeted blocking.
We do not show results for our most restrictive model (i.e., Cookie Matching-Only) in Figure 14 , since the majority of A&A companies view almost zero impressions. Specifically, 90% of A&A companies view less Table 5 , which shows that even under strict blocking strategies, top advertising companies still view 40-75% of the impressions.
Summary.
Overall, there are three takeaways from our simulations. First, the "no blocking" simulation results show that top A&A domains are able to see the vast majority of users' browsing history, which is extremely troubling from a privacy perspective. For example, even under the most constrained propagation model (Cookie Matching-Only), DoubleClick still observes 90% of all impressions generated by our simulated users. Second, it is troubling to observe that AdBlock Plus barely improves users' privacy, due to the Acceptable Ads whitelist containing high-degree ad exchanges. Third, we find that users can improve their privacy by blocking A&A domains, but that the choice of blocking strategy is critically important. We find that the Disconnect blacklist offers the greatest reduction in observable impressions, while Ghostery offers significantly less protection. However, even when strong blocking is used, top A&A domains still observe anywhere from 40-80% of simulated users' impressions.
Random Browsing Model
Thus far, we have analyzed results for users that follow the browsing model from Burklen et al. [14] . This is, to the best of our knowledge, the only empirically validated browsing model.
To check the consistency of our simulation results, we ran additional simulations using a random browsing model, where the user chooses publishers purely at random, and chooses whether to remain on a publisher or depart using a coin flip. We plot the results of the random simulations in Figure 15 as the difference in fraction of impressions observed by A&A domains under the RTB Relaxed model. Zero indicates that an A&A domain observed the same fraction of impressions in both the Burklen et al. and random user simulations, while <0 (>0) indicates that the node observed more impressions in the random (Burklen et al.) simulations. Between 20-60% of A&A nodes observe the same amount of impressions regardless of model, but this is because these nodes all observe zero impressions (i.e., they are blocked). This is why the fraction of A&A nodes that do not change between the browsing models is greatest with Disconnect. Although up to 10% of A&A nodes observe more impressions under the random browsing model, the majority of A&A nodes that observe at least one impression observe more overall under the Burklen et al. model.
Overall, Figure 15 demonstrates that the baseline browsing behavior exhibited by a user does have a significant impact on their visibility to A&A companies. For example, using the Burklen et al. model [14] , the selected publishers contact top 10 A&A domains (sorted by PageRank) 2.6× more than those selected by the random browsing model (and 4.6× if we consider the top 10 A&A domains sorted by betweenness centrality).
Importantly, however, the relative effectiveness of blocking strategies remains the same under a random browsing model. Disconnect still performed the best, followed by top 10%, Ghostery, random 30%, and then AdBlock Plus. This suggests that our findings with respect to the efficacy of blocking strategies generalizes to users with different browsing behaviors.
Limitations
As with all simulated models, there are some limitations to our work.
First, our models of indirect impression dissemination are approximations. The Cookie Matching-Only and RTB Relaxed models should be viewed as lowerand upper-estimates, respectively, on the dissemination of impressions, not as accurate reflections of reality (for the reasons highlighted in Figure 8 ). We believe that the RTB Constrained model is a reasonable approximation, but even it has flaws: it may still exhibit false positives, if non-exchanges are included in the set of exchanges E, and false negatives if an actual exchange is not included in E. Furthermore, it is not clear in general if ad exchanges always forward all impressions to all partners. For example, private exchanges that connect high-value publishers (e.g., The New York Times) to select pools of advertisers behave differently than their public cousins.
Second, our results are dependent on assumptions about the browsing behavior of users. We present results from two browsing models in § 5.5 and show that many of our headline results are robust. However, these findings should not be over-generalized: they are representative for an average user, yet specific individuals may experience different amounts of tracking.
Third, we must translate rules from the EasyList blacklist and the Acceptable Ads whitelist to use them in our simulations. Both of these lists include rules containing regular expressions, URLs, and even snippets of CSS; we simplify them to lists of effective 2 nd -level domains. Due to this translation, we may over-estimate impressions seen by the whitelisted A&A domains, and under-estimate impressions seen by blacklisted A&A domains. Note that the Ghostery and Disconnect blacklists are not affected by these issues.
Fourth, we analyze a dataset that was collected in December 2015. The structure of the Inclusion graph has almost certainly changed since then. Furthermore, the edge weights between nodes may differ depending on the initial set of publishers that are crawled. Although we demonstrate in § 5.3 that our dataset covers the vast majority of A&A domains, the connectivity and weights between A&A domains may change over time.
Fifth, our dataset does not cover the mobile advertising ecosystem, which is known to differ from the web ecosystem [72] . Thus our results likely do not generalize to this area.
Conclusion
In this paper, we introduce a novel graph model of the advertising ecosystem called an Inclusion graph. This representation is enabled by advances in browser instrumentation [6, 41] that allow researchers to capture the precise inclusion relationships between resources from different A&A domains [10] . Using a large, crawled dataset from [10] , we show that the ad ecosystem is extremely dense. Furthermore, we compare our Inclusion graph representation to a Referer graph representation proposed by prior work [29] , and show that the Referer graph has substantive structural differences that are caused by erroneously attributed edges.
We show that our Inclusion graph can be used to implement empirically-driven simulations of the online ad ecosystem. Our results demonstrate that under a variety of assumptions about user browsing and advertiser interaction behavior, top A&A companies observe the vast majority of users' browsing history. Even under realistic conditions where only a small number of well-connected ad exchanges indirectly share impressions, 10% of A&A companies observe more than 90% impressions and 82% publishers.
We also evaluate a variety of ad and tracker blocking strategies in the context of our models, to understand their effectiveness at stopping A&A companies from learning users' browsing history. On one hand, we find that blocking the top 10% of A&A domains, as well as the Disconnect blacklist, do significantly reduce the observation of users' browsing. On the other hand, even these strategies still leak 40-80% of users' browsing history to top A&A domains, under realistic assumptions. This suggests that users who truly care about privacy on the web should adopt the most stringent blocking tools available, such as EasyList and EasyPrivacy, or consider disabling JavaScript by default with an extension like uMatrix [28] .
